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Disposable Workforce in Italy 
 
This paper explores the “disposable” patterns of workforce utilization in Italy, well under way 
before the cyclical downturn of the early 90’s and before the main reforms of the Italian labor 
market. The term “disposable” reflects the fact that many young people enter the labor 
market, their services are “used” as a disposable commodity for a few years, after which they 
leave the labor market altogether and are no longer observable in the official (administrative) 
data. Workforce disposal is evident and dramatic: out of 100 new young entries, about 70 are 
still in the labor market 10 years after entry if their first job spell was at least one year long. 
For those – three times as many – who have started their career with a short employment 
spell (< 3 months), 10-year survival does not reach 50%. We show that the order of 
magnitude of workforce disposal is consistent with the official LFS youth unemployment rate 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper explores the “disposable” patterns of male workforce utilization 
in Italy, apparently under way before the cyclical downturn of the early 90’s and 
before the main reforms of the Italian labor market. The term “disposable” reflects 
the fact that many young people enter the labor market, their services are “used” 
as a disposable commodity for a few years, after which they are – as it were – 
disposed. “Disposed” in the sense that they are no longer observed in 
administrative databases that cover the entire population of workers over their 
lifetime.
1 In addition to its obvious socio-economic implications – the very low 
participation rate of young people - workforce disposal has adverse effects on 
human capital accumulation as the planning horizon becomes too short: skill 
depletion is one aspect, but the lack of incentives to invest in human capital both 
for employers and employees is the other, perhaps more important aspect. 
 
To my knowledge, the concept of “disposable workforce” is new. There 
are, of course, innumerable studies that touch upon more or less closely related 
issues: unemployment duration and state dependence, labor force outflows at 
young age, permanent displacement after layoff, labor market segmentation, 
attrition in longitudinal datasets. A survey of this literature would require a 
contribution of its own to the JEL, and even the selection of the main contributions 
for each of the above items would be arbitrary. 
 
In this paper I consider the average pseudo-survival
2 of cells defined by 
annual cohorts of young male employees, year of first employment, length of job 
spells, geographical area, industry and firm size of initial position. A detailed 
descriptive analysis is provided in the first part of the paper: the “disposable” 
pattern per se  is  an important and worrisome discovery. The second part of the 
paper aims at suggesting a line of interpretation of the short-medium run 
developments. A more comprehensive exploration of the long run evolution of this 
aspect of the Italian labor market is, for the time being, problematic for lack of 
appropriate data. 
                                                 
1 Attrition is the term normally  used to define such occurrences in survey-based longitudinal 
databases. It reflects  problems of data collection and management. Here the attrition that we 
observe is the product of perfectly explainable  patterns of workforce utilization, which have 
nothing to do with data collection. I will no longer refer to attrition in this paper, although some 
genuine, undistinguishable, attrition  may be present in the data. Undoubtedly, however, the latter 
is a minuscule share of the former. 
2I use the term “pseudo-survival” to define the process  by which  workers are disposed. The term 
“survival” would be inappropriate as a survival function has a well defined meaning in statistics. 
A pseudo-survival schedule, as defined here, is a time-decreasing function that indicates the 
number of workers of a given cohort/cell still active in the labor market, i.e. who have not been 
“disposed” after a given number of years. I will, nonetheless, often use the term “survival” in lieu 
of “pseudo-survival”.   3
All the data come from the WHIP database, the source of which is the 
Italian Social Security Administration (INPS). 
The key finding of this paper can be summarized as follows: out of 100 new 
young male entries, between 45 and 85 % are still at work 2 years after entry, 35 
to 70% after 10 years, and only 25 to 40% after 17 years. A bad start makes a large 
difference in future outcomes. For those who have had a continuous 12-month 
employment spell at entry, survival at work  after 10 years is about 85%. For those 
– three times as many - who have started their career with one or more short 
employment spells (< 3 months), survival does not reach 50%. Among the self-
employed survival is higher
3. Initial wages are also good predictors of survival: 
the probability of surviving after a bad start (first job spell < 3 months and wage < 




These numbers raise several questions, in addition to the obvious 
preoccupation for the magnitude of the “disposal” pattern as such, and the adverse 
effects that it will have on the labor market. Where do all the “disposed” workers 
end up ?  Some youth may go back to school, but ought to reappear after few years 
(which does not seem to be the case). A number of young entrants move into the 
black economy (by definition, unobservable, the order of magnitude estimated by 
ISTAT at 15-20% of the labor force). Few are hired each year in the non-
observable public sectors (military or police service); the same holds for the 
university graduates who move directly in professional independent activities. 
 
A similar, preliminary, exploration in Norway and Denmark indicates that 
the pseudo-survival rate 10 years after entry is between 90 and 95% of the initial 
lot. Suggesting that the institutional setting explains such a huge difference may be 
true, but won’t tell what is behind the story. This exploration is the first attempt in 
this direction. 
 
An important result – not yet an explanation – indicates that these 
estimates, at first sight dramatic, are consistent with an “extended” definition of 
unemployment that  includes the individuals who belong to the irregular 
(undetectable) sectors of the economy. Which does not reduce the seriousness of 
the problem, and the difficulty of formulating policy recommendations. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: par. 2 provides the background picture 
with a short description of the Italian labor market. Par. 3 describes the WHIP data 
coverage and how to bypass some of its shortcomings. The estimation of pseudo-
                                                 
3The survival perspective of the self-employed will be the object of a separate investigation. 
4A similar finding on UK data is reported in Stewart, Mark B & Swaffield, Joanna K, 1999. "Low 
Pay Dynamics and Transition Probabilities", Economica, vol. 66 (261), pages 23-42, February.    4
survival is the object of Par. 4. Par. 5 shows some unexpected gender differences 
in pseudo-survival. A quasi-Markov chain representation of the process of 
workforce disposal is presented in par. 6, confirming that the estimates of pseudo-
survival are consistent with the indications of the official LFS. Descriptive 
statistics on age wage differentials are provided in par. 7. A regression model 
aimed at explaining the short-medium run features of pseudo-survival is the object 
of par. 8. Non-parametric (diff-in-diff) estimators of the net impact of labor costs 
on survival are presented in par. 9. Par. 10 deals with the problem of self-selection 





According to official statistics, Italy’s unemployment rate of the 14-29  has 
hovered around 20% for many years, the second highest in the European Union. 
Long term unemployment touches 2/3 of the unemployed. Not until 2006 did 
youth unemployment take a downturn of 2-3 p.p., matched, not surprisingly, by an 
increase in turnover rates. 
  
In Italy youth employment (20-29) steadily increased since the Sixties til 
1990 (from 4.0 million in 1968 to slightly less than 5.0 million in 1990), a 
consequence of the baby boom and of the increased participation of young 
women. The trend dramatically reversed in the early Nineties before the 1993 
recession: in 2002 dependent employment of the young was back to the level of 
the mid Seventies, in spite of: (1) several programs aimed at enhancing labor 
market entry since the mid Eighties; (2) the new cohorts shrank from 900,000 
during the baby boom to 500,000 nowadays. 
 
The modal age of employment entry hovered around 21 for many years: 
since the Nineties the outflow of young workers from employment began to 
exceed the inflow within 3-4 years from entry.  Net employment flows turned 
negative, suggesting that the “disposable” pattern of labor force utilization was 
already well under way before the cyclical downturn. 
 
Labor market entry at the end of school is problematic too, compared to EU 
standards: the one-year transition probability for youth aged (15-19) is estimated 
at  0.54  from the Italian LFS, implying an average delay of 2 years after school 
termination. The same probability at age (20-24) is 0.69, and at age (25-29) is 
0.70. University graduates (first level degree) face a 8.5 months average waiting 
time before finding a job, from a minimum of 5 months for engineering graduates 
and a maximum of 13 months for jurisprudence graduates. The average   5




The labor market reforms of the last twenty years – leading to a variety of 
increasingly flexible working arrangements - have changed this picture only to a 
limited extent. After the introduction of the CFL (contratti di formazione e lavoro, 
1984) and the Pacchetto Treu (1996), which extended the utilization of temporary 
contracts, worker turnover among the young increased only marginally. Prior to 
those years, it was common practice to terminate working contracts (not only of 
the young) circumventing a legislation which was very protective on paper, but 
easily bypassed in practice (as jurists put it, the “law in the books” is one thing, the 
”law in action” quite another matter). The reforms have, as it where, legalized a 
good many of those terminations. 
 
Fig. 1 below shows the increasing trend of separation rates from standard, 
open-end positions  in the 1986-2003  time window. There is a sudden increase of 
young workers’ separations starting in 1994, two years before the Pacchetto Treu. 
 
Tab. 1 displays the labor market status of individuals aged 16-35, four years 
after termination of their first employment experience: only in 25% of cases this 
was a permanent position. One half of all individuals are found in a permanent, 
open-end position after 4 years. More than one third are on atypical contracts. And 
even among those who had a standard, permanent contract as their first job, over 















Fig.1 Separation rates from standard, open-end positions 1986-2003 
 
                                                 
5All the data of University graduates come from the Alma Laurea Survey 2007 and refer to 
graduation earned in 2006.   6

















Standard 885 24.4  7.6  58.1  26.5  7.8 
Permanent part-
time 
204 5.6  13.7  39.7  38.7  7.9 
Training-and-
work  (CFL) 
304 8.4  6.2  65.5  20.7  7.6 
Apprentice 920  25.3  8.0  38.9  45.9  7.2 
Temp (work-
leasing) 
146 4.0  4.1  66.5  25.3  4.1 
Seasonal 118 3.2  11.0  43.2  39.0  6.8 





433 12.0  8.5  37.0  46.5  7.9 
Self-empl. 38  1.1 5.3 42.1  15.8  36.8 
ALL 3635  100.0  8.0  50.1  34.4  7.5 
Source: F. Berton, M. Richiardi, S. Sacchi (2008), p.122 
 
The next graph (fig. 2) shows the new entries in the labor market in the 
1986-2002 period: the dotted line displays the newly hired whose first initial spell 
lasted at least 12 months, the thick one those whose initial spell lasts less than 3 
months. The upper graph depicts the age-group 25-30; the lower one the group 
(19-22). The number of “long” initial spells declines rapidly after peaking 2-3 
after 1986. The number of “very short” ones increases throughout the whole 
period for the 25-30 group, and until 1994 for the younger age group, after which 
it tapers off and then slightly declines. Throughout the Eighties many of the newly 
hired were able to stay with their first employer at least one year before 
undertaking a pattern of mobility; and very short initial spells were relatively rare. 
We are therefore facing an unambiguous signal of increased mobility at the 
beginning of one’s career, which persists at all ages. 
 
Number of MALE workers by 
length of initial employment 
spell  between 1986 and 2003 
========================
age 25-30
---------- 12 months +
---------- <  3  months
age 19 – 22
---------- 12 months +
---------- <  3  months







Fig. 2 No. workers by length of initial employment spell 1986-2003.   7
On paper the Italian labour market presents a high degree of employment 
protection.  Protection, however, turns out to be mainly “in the books”, much less 
so “in action”. Such questions as “are the dismissed ones eligible for 
unemployment benefits?”, “does the previous employment experience of laid off 
workers permit a fast re-employment ?”, are negatively answered and cogently 
discussed in a recent book by F. Berton, M. Richiardi and S. Sacchi.
6 
The probability of becoming trapped in long term unemployment has been 
the object of recent investigation by Contini & Poggi (2009): unemployment state 
dependence is estimated at 61%, a very high estimate compared to most other EU 
countries, and – as elsewhere - is negatively correlated with initial wages. 
 
 
3.  The WHIP data and coverage 
 
The WHIP longitudinal data are a representative sample of the population 
of employees of the private sector, the self-employed, as well as all those covered 
by atypical (non-standard) contracts. The sample - population ratio is 1:90. WHIP 
observations start in 1986 and, as of today, end in 2004. The next update of the 
sample will soon be available and take us through 2008. 
 
For the purpose of this exploration the (existing) data of the “contratti di 
collaborazione”, a widely used atypical form of disguised self-employment, 
cannot be used. All our conclusions, however, would be robustly strengthened if 
such data were available. The atypical contracts apply, among many others, to the 
public sector employees with non-tenured positions. WHIP does not cover tenured 
employees of the public sector (including the military service and the police), nor 
the professionals working on their own. As will be argued, this is a relatively 
minor problem for an exploration like this, targeted at young people. In addition, 
the WHIP data do not provide information on the unemployment status unless 
individuals receive unemployment benefits (an unlikely event under current Italian 
legislation. Protection against temporary layoffs is offered by the Earnings 
Integration Fund (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni ) which is observed in the WHIP 
database. 
 
A problem of self-selection could be raised in connection with our 
measurement of “disposable” workforce. The individuals whom we consider 
“disposed” once they leave the panel and are no longer observable could, in 
principle, be entering the world of big business (excluding self employment, 
which we do observe and account for), or the professions, on a path of upward 
mobility. There are reasons to believe that the problem is negligible, and that none 
                                                 
6 Flex-insecurity:perchè in Italia la flessibilità diventa precarietà, Il Mulino (2009) 
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of our results would be harmed. The main one being that the vast majority of those 
who are “disposed” quickly do very poorly in terms of initial job tenure and pay. 
But there are many others. At any rate, I leave this defense to the last paragraph of 
the paper. 
Also truncation at the end of the observation period could upward bias the 
estimate of workforce disposal for those entering in the late Nineties. This does 
not seem to be a major problem: the order of magnitude and characteristics of 
pseudo-survival in the first 5-7 years of career of those who entered the labor 
market in the mid Eighties is very similar to what is observed for the younger 
entries.  In my judgment, the 8-10 year-absence of a young male from 
administrative files that cover the entire population of economically active people 
is more than sufficient to consider him “disposed”. 
 
The outflows of young people toward the public sector and the professional 










 % professionals 
5 years after 
grad.    
No. 
professional 















3  yrs 
after 
grad. 
Engineering 3500  16  560  11  400  250 
Medical 
School 
2100 54  1130  36  750  500 
Humanities  5000  0 0 48  2500  750 
Law 4900  8  400 18  900  700 
Architect. 1600 50  800  19  320  120 
Psychology 1400  16  200  34  450  300 
Economics & 
Business 
4900 2  100  15  750  390 
Total 23400  13.6 3190 25.9  6070  3010 
 
About 9% of university graduates are unemployed 1 year after graduation, 
and the waiting time before the first job is 8,5 months. At least 26% of university 
graduates work as “disguised self-employed” 3 years after graduation (certainly a 
lower bound, as some fields are missing from the table, all of them leading to less 
upward mobility than the ones included). It is a very safe guess estimating that at 
least 2/3 of all the university graduates are hired via atypical contracts (about 
16000 individuals/year). Professionals are not observed in WHIP. But the 
university graduates who are in the professions 5 years after the end of studies 
                                                 
7  The Alma Laurea Survey covers all Italian Universities except  Rome and Milan (which, alone, 
account for 30% of all University graduates).  Tab.2 includes estimates of Rome and Milan, 
according to the proportions of the Survey..   9
number about 3200, on average 160 entries each year
8. All of them begin their 
career in professional studies, hired – another safe guess - with non-standard 
contracts. Alma Laurea indicates also that over 25% of all university graduates 
move into the public sector within 3 years from graduation. But it is a well known 
fact that all the young hires of the Italian public sector have taken place via 
atypical contracts at least since the late Eighties. Very few, very lucky ones will be 
granted tenure after 2-3 years. The vast majority will have to wait  8/10 years, and 
until then they will be observed in WHIP
9. Once they move into tenured positions 
they will be well in their thirties, no longer relevant for this exploration. 
 
 
4.  Estimating pseudo-survival  
 
The analysis is performed on cells of individuals of the same gender, 
belonging to the same cohort and who had their first job in the same year, to the 
same industrial branch (manufacturing and services) and geographical area 
(Northern, Central,  and  Southern Italy).  The length of the initial employment 
spell is an additional dimension (< 3 months, 3-12 months, > 12 months). 
In most of the analysis we deal with thousands of cells, each observed at 
one-year distance from 1986  through 2002. In some cases we also disaggregate 
cells by size of the first employer (small= <20 employees; medium= 20-200; large 
= 200+). Each cell includes from a minimum of 18 to a maximum of 1089 
individuals.  
Survival is estimated in each cell counting the number of individuals who 
have not disappeared from the database at the end of the observation period. Fig. 3 
describes the counting methodology: it shows one cell containing the work 
histories of  8 individuals, A through H, observed between 1986 (year of entry for 
all) and 2008: 
 
                                                 
8  It is, obviously, more likely that those who move into the world of professionals will do so 4-5 
years after graduation, rather than 1-2 years. But the substance does not change. 
9  In WHIP the “instruction” activity sector includes teachers of both public and private schools. 
As said before, public school personnel is observed if non- tenured. In Italy the proportion of 
public school teachers and employees to private school employees is about 10:1. From WHIP we 
observe 50% of all school personnel below 30 years of age; 63% of those below 28, over 20% 
below 40. 90% are public employees, all queuing for tenure.   10
 
Fig.3 Counting pseudo survival. 
 
Let the survival count take place in 2008. In year 1993 we count the 
following survivors: A, B, C, D, F, G and H (yielding a survival rate = 7/8 = 
0.875), as E has exited two years after entry and no longer reappears. In year 2000 
the following have survived: A, B, C, D, G and H, yielding a survival equal to 6/8 
= 0.75. Notice that, as the count is done in 2008, individual B is counted as 
survivor through 2003, as he did go into unemployment (extended version) 
between 1991 and 1993, and between 1997 and 1999, but his working career 
continues at least until 2003. Obviously, in 2008 he could find himself in a long 
spell of unemployment whose ending will occur years later. If that were the case, 
our survival count in 2003 would be downward biased. This is the truncation 
problem that we (partially) avoid  by restricting the observation window to 1998, 
which leaves 6 extra years before truncation. The complete count through 1998 
would lead to the following survival curve: 
 
1986  87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 
1  1  7/8 7/8 7/8 7/8 7/8 7/8    6/8 6/8 6/8 6/8 6/8 
OUT  ---  E E E E E E E,F  E,F  E,F  E,F  E,F 
 
Fig. 4 depicts a prototype of pseudo-survival curve, aimed at showing the 
main differences that emerge on impact. The first one is attributable to the length 
of the first employment spell. Out of 100 new entries with initial employment spell 
< 3 months, approximately 60 survive 10 years after entry. If the initial 
employment spell > 12 months, the 10-year survival rate is 86. 
   11
 
Fig. 4 Patterns of pseudo-survival. 
 
Several additional factors determine survival. One is the timing in the 
business cycle of labor market entry: if the initial job starts in expansionary years, 
the survival is likely to be higher than if the working career begins during 
recession times. The geographical area makes some difference, and so does the 
industry. Simple econometric explorations yield several results to which I shall 
return in due time. 
 
For the time being, let it be clear what these pseudo-survivals imply and 
what they don’t imply: the above 60 survivors (with initial job spell < 3 months) 
are not people necessarily at work for 10 consecutive years: they may have had 
alternating employment and non-employment spells in the 10-year period, but 
have re-entered employment at the end of the 10-th year of observation. We are 
dealing with a process of in-and-outs of employment, which, in principle, might 
involve equally all the new entries as in a big job sharing experiment, each 
working 60% of the time and being idle the remaining 40%. Not unexpectedly, 
this is not the case of Italy (nor, for that matter, of any other country, the 
Netherlands being the only possible outlier). 
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Fig. 5.1 -5.4 Pseudo-survival curves for selected cohorts and year-of-entry. 
 
A few selected pseudo-survival curves are displayed in fig.5.1-5.4. Each 
figure shows the pseudo-survival measured in cells composed of individuals of 
same gender, age group (at the time of first job), geographical area and economic   14
branch. The upper graph refers to cohorts who experienced a very short 
employment spell (< 3 months), the lower one to the same cohorts with a long 
spell (> 12 months). In addition, two cohorts are compared in the same graph: the 
dotted line refers to cohorts who first entered in 1988 (expansionary cycle), and 
are followed till (t+14=2002), the thick one refers to entries of 1993 
(recessionary), followed till (t+9=2002). The impact of the first spell duration is 
very clear: an immediate drop of survival in (t+1) and (t+2), followed by a 
continuing relatively steep fall. The impact of the business cycle on survival is 
also visible: the fall is usually steeper for the cohorts entering in 1993. Less clear, 
at first sight, is the impact of the age group and that of the sector of economic 
activity. Important differences will emerge as we turn to regression analyses.  
 
 
5.  Women do better than men… 
 
The survival data of young women indicate that women at early age do 
better than men
10: tab. 3 compares male and women of two age groups, entering 
the labor market at three different points in time: 1988 at the beginning of an 
expansionary cycle, 1992 at the start of the recession of the Nineties, and 1996 at 
the end of the downturn. Attrition is measured 3, 7, 11 and 15 years after entry. 
The bold figures denote where women’s survival is higher than men’s: this is 
always the case in the younger group (19-22) at t+3 and t+7, i.e. until the included 
individuals reach the age of  22-25 and 26-29 respectively. It also occurs in the 
course of the recessionary years 1992-96 in the older age group (26-30), again at 
t+3 at age 29-32, and at t+7 at age 33-37. Men’s survival becomes higher as 
women reach the age of child bearing and family chores. Surprisingly, however, 
the differences are smaller than one might expect: for instance, in 2003, t+15 for 
those who had their first work experience in 1988, attrition rates of the age group 
by then (41-45) is 0.56 for men and only 0.57 for women. This phenomenon, 
which may hide composition effects attributable to the specific industries where 
people are employed, is worth deeper investigation which must be left for another 
occasion. 
                                                 
10  The longer survival of young women in Italy and Germany  has been noticed also in a recent 
paper by G. Giannelli, U. Jaenichen and C. Villosio, “Have labour market reforms at the turn of 
the millennium changed job durations of the new entrants?”, W.P. LABOR (2009).  
 
   15
Tab. 3.1: Male dependent workers = % no longer at work t years after entry 
age    (0)  +3  +7  +11 +15 (0)  +3  +7  +11 (0)  +3  +7 
19-22 entry 
1988 
.18 .26 .34 .43 entry 
1992 
.19 .29 .42 entry 
1996 
.17 .34 
26-30  1988  .24 .35 .44 .56 1992  .29 .41 .52 1996  .28 .40 
         Åexpanding  business cycle--><-recessionary cycle  Æ   Å  end downturn 
  
Tab. 3.2: Female dependent workers = % no longer at work t years after entry 
age    (0)  +3 +7 +11  +15  (0)  +3 +7 +11  (0)  +3 +7 
19-22 entry 
1988 
.15 .24 .35 .47 entry 
1992 
.15 .27 .45 entry 
1996 
.15 .33 
26-30  1988  .27 .38 .48 .57 1992  .27 .39 .55 1996  .29 .47 
          Å expanding  business cycle--> <-recessionary cycleÆ   Å  end downturn 
 
 
6 . A quasi-Markov chain representation of the youth labor market 
 
The youth labor market lends itself to a representation in terms of a quasi-
Markov chain
11. The chain is defined by states that correspond to employment and 
“extended” unemployment of different durations: one-year employment,  more-
than-one-year employment, one-year unemployment, two-year unemployment, 
more-then two-years unemployment. Transition probabilities are estimated on the 
basis of a standard logit model à la Heckman on individual careers of male 
workers aged 16-29
12 Transitions are allowed only between time-contiguous 
states: 
 
from / to       U1         U2                    U3+       E1         E2+ 
U1 0  0.60  0  0.4 0 
U2  0 0 0.85  0.15  0 
U3+  0 0 0.93  0.07  0 
E1  0.05  0 0 0 0.96 
E2+  0.04  0 0 0 0.96 
Steady-state 
  U   = 27% 
0.03 0.02 0.22 0.03 0.70 
 
                                                 
11A quasi-Markov chain is defined as a process in which states may not be of equal length.  
Transitions are estimated as usually, and the steady state is calculated and interpreted as in any  
Markov chain,  but a concept like the mean recurrence time is no longer applicable.  
12 See B. Contini and A. Poggi (2008).   16
The steady state distribution of the above matrix (reached in 6-7 iterations 
from a starting position close to the one observed  in the late Nineties) yields the 
following result: 73% of the workforce in employment (70% in more-than-one-
year positions  E2+); 27% unemployed, extended definition (of which 22%  in 
long term unemployment U3++). The steady state unemployment figure is 6-8 p.p. 
higher than the official youth unemployment rate at the beginning of the 
Millennium: this difference is coherent with the hypothesis that over 200 thousand 
young men may be hidden in the irregular sectors, without any presence in the 
official economy
13, and therefore undetected in the Labor Force Survey. The 200 
thousand - figure is reached as follows: 6-8 p.p. of the male workforce aged 16-24  
(population  4.2 million, participation rate 30% = 1.2 million workforce) yields 
100 thousand individuals. 6-8% of the male workforce 25-29 (population 2 
million; participation 60% = 1.2 million workforce), yields the remaining 100 
thousand
14. The figure of 200 thousand male individuals (16-29) is a conservative 
estimate of the presence of young men in the black economy, estimated at least 
15% of total labor force according to official statistics. 
The quasi-Markovian representation allows to estimate also the impact of 
public programs aimed at increasing the job finding rate of young people.  An 
unrealistically effective labor exchange might increase it by 20% starting from U1 
and U2, somewhat less from U3+. The new transition matrix looks as follows: 
 
from / to  U1  U2  U3+  E1  E2+ 
U1  0  0.52 0  0.48 0 
U2  0 0 0.82  0.18  0 
U3+  0 0 0.92  0.08  0 
E1  0.05  0 0 0 0.96 
E2+  0.04  0 0 0 0.96 
Steady-state 
 U =  20.4% 
0.036 0.020 0.148 0.040 0.756 
                                                 
13Excluding, therefore, people who work for black money, in addition to holding a regular job 
(for instance a blue-collar at Fiat who rounds the budget doing plumbing maintenance during the 
week-ends). 
Furthermore, the earnings of criminal and/or mafia-type activities are often laundered / invested 
in “regular” covering businesses; thus, also outright criminals may appear as “regular” workers.  
14The borderline between inactivity, unemployment without subsidies and irregular activities 
defies detection in the WHIP data, but similar problems arise also in LFS-type surveys, all the 
more so in  areas where there is a considerable amount of black-grey (or next-to-criminal) 
activities. Here, a young male who reports to be working, may be a “regular“ or an “irregular” 
worker. He may report to be unemployed even if he works full time in the black. Being classified 
as  “inactive” or “unemployed” depends on the classification rules and the interpretation given to 
one’s “recent” job search activity (see E. Battistin and E. Rettore, 2008). There is plenty of 
anecdotal evidence (to be taken very seriously) that many youth who work in the black economy 
will report themselves as unemployed or inactive. In the poorest neighbourhoods of Naples 
estimated youth unemployment is close to 40%, with  the extent of the black economy also 
known to be at its highest. The  situation in the banlieus of Paris may not be too different. 
   17
Its steady state distribution has 75.6 % of the workforce in employment and 
20.4 % in extended unemployment: quite an improvement over the present 
situation. This is, however, only the estimated impact on the young: a necessary 
but insufficient information to formulate a judgement on the welfare benefits of 
the program. A higher take-up rate of workers aged 15-29 might, in fact, crowd 




7  The increasing wage differentials between young and older  
 workers 
 
Italy is following the world-wide trend of increasing wage differentials, 
attributable to the demand for high skills. Wage differentials between young and 
adult-older individuals have increased also independently from the skill 
component; and the reforms aimed at enhancing the job opportunities of young 
people – by introducing wage subsidies to employers - have had an additional 
effect of widening them. Tab. 4 displays mean and percentiles of the gross wage 
differential ratios between blue-collars, aged <25 and >45, regularly employed as 
dependent workers. In 1985 the mean ratio was 0.71; it steadily declined through 
2003.  We do not have systematic data of labor costs of some of the atypical 
contracts that have become popular in the last decade (in particular the “co.co.co” 
or “co.co.pro” contracts, both basically disguised self-employment contracts): 
undoubtedly, however, they would make the comparison look even less favorable 
for the young. 
 









                                                 
15In B. Contini et al. (2005) it was estimated that the CFL program  (contratto di formazione e 
lavoro) for youth aged <29  had a non-negligible negative impact on the no-longer-eligible 
cohorts.   18
8. Regression estimates of the determinants of pseudo-survival
16 
 
We estimate the determinants of pseudo-survival between-cells of 
individuals with very similar characteristics. Estimation on individual work 
histories is less advisable if a long term interpretation is desired. The number of 
observable, very homogeneous cells is high, which helps to bypass the problem of 
unobserved heterogeneity without harming the main results (heterogeneity gets 
averaged out across the individuals belonging to the cell). 
Regressions on pseudo-survival ought to be done with care: all pseudo-
survival schedules are monotonically decreasing in time, each having at most 17 
time observations for the first observable labor market entries (1986), and only 7 
for the most recent ones (1996). Therefore the introduction of too many dummies 
(some of which are necessary) will yield high R2, leaving little of substance to be 
explained. 
It is therefore prudent to take first differences of pseudo survival and use 
these as dependent variables, rather than levels.  
 
Cells are defined by the following items: 
-  age group of the relevant cohort (3 groups) 
-  gender 
-  year of first entry in the labor market (15 years, from 1988 to2001) 
-  duration of first employment spell (3 groups) 
-  economic branch of activity (2 industries)  
-  geographical area (3 areas) 
-  size of first employer (3 size groups) 
The number of cells is 48600 (the product of all the above attributes): 
obviously, many are empty, and some include no more than 2 individuals. We 
have decided to retain only those with at least 4 individuals, which leaves over 
3000 cells in Northern Italy and over 2500 in Southern Italy of male workers, and 
about 2/3 as many of women. 
Graphical exploration has already helped to single out two important 
factors: the duration of the first employment spell as a proxy of initial conditions, 
and the timing of labor market entry that catches the impact of the business cycle. 
Both have been used to define the cells. All the defining attributes enter as control 
regressors, altogether 19 dummy variables. 
At least three additional factors ought to “explain” pseudo-survival: 
-  the growth rate of labor cost, specific to each age group 
17 
-  the inflows of potential competitors of different sex 
                                                 
16A simple model of labor demand for permanent vs. temporary working contracts provides the 
theoretical framework. It is briefly sketched in Appendix 2, entitled “A nutshell model of labor 
demand…”  
17  Total labor cost includes social security contributions and other indirect elements, and is net of 
employer subsidies.   19
-  the youth participation rate as a proxy of labor supply.  
 
Labor cost is the immediate benchmark that employers use to retain or 
layoff individual workers. My assumption is that it is a valid cost benchmark also 
at the level of the cells. 
 
   
Fig. 6 
 
Fig. 6 and 7 show the trends 1987-2002 of the rate of change of labor cost 
in manufacturing of Northern Italy and in the services of the South.. The variance 
of labor cost growth is higher in the service industries (not only in this example), 
and also among the youngest 19-22 age group, with more peaked spikes and 
troughs.  The patterns are similar for all age groups in the North, less in the South. 
This is a consequence of programs of territorially-based employment subsidies 
(aimed at enhancing job creation of young people) that were implemented and 
phased out depending on the state of public finances. The observation period 
1986-2002 suggests the following break-down of the cyclical phase: 1986-1991 
expansion; 1992-1996 recession; 1998-2002  slow recovery.  Both in the North 
and the South average growth of labor costs (the thick horizontal line within each 
of the three sub-periods)  is higher in 1986-91 than in the next two phases.  The 
1992-96 average growth is still somewhat higher than that of the last cyclical 
phase in the North, and only marginally in the South. 




Women are important competitors of young males, especially in the white-
collar professions. We intend to estimate their impact on survival using the yearly 
employment inflows of women of all ages in the same industry and geographical 
area (ddonnentr). 
Labor supply is proxied by the participation rate of young people (men and 
women, aged 15-24) in the relevant geographical area (dpart_giov). 
 
The estimated specification is therefore: 
 
∆ surv(g,t)  = a +  b* d-clav (g,t) +  c* ddonnentr (t) + d* dpart_giov (t) +   
e* all relevant dummies(g)  +  u(g,t) 
 
where we expect:  b<0;  c <0;  d  = ?.    
 
For the time being we concentrate on male workers alone. We run 4 sets of 
regressions, separately for individuals working in manufacturing and service 
industries, located in Northern and Southern Italy. The building industry is left out 
for simplicity in order to avoid strongly seasonal components; Central Italy is also 
left out in order to focus on the main geographical differences between North and 
South.   21
Tab. 6: Northern Italy-OLS (weighted). Regressions on a ∆ pseudo survival 
Regr  19-22 19-22 22-25 22-25  25-30  25-30 
  Services Mfg Services Mfg  Services  Mfg 
d-clav  -.044 *  -.089 *  -.118 **  -.102 *  -.126 **  .218 ** 
Dur 3-12  .026 **  .024 **  .018 *  .013  .012 *  .003 
Dur 12 +  .045 ***  .063 ***  .035 ***  .054 ***  .043 ***  .045 *** 
Med -0 .002  0 .008  *  .007  0 
Big  -0  .008 *  0  .013 *  0  .008 
Dum- 
entry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Donn_entr  0 0 0 0  0  0 
Dpart_gio
v 
0 0 0 0  0  0 
R**2  adj  .19  .17  .10  .09  .10  .08 
n. obs  1060  1078  1029  979  993  1028 
 














Tab. 6 and 7 report the results of the weighted OLS regressions for each age 
group, activity branch and geographical area.
18 Recall that, except for <d-
clav>,<ddonnentr> and <dpart_giov>,  all regressors are dummy variables and 
therefore the coefficient estimates are measures of the impact of each on  pseudo-
survival. The results suggest the following: 
-  the duration of the first employment spells (spells < 3 months = 
benchmark) strongly confirm the positive impact on survival noticeable also by 
visual inspection: up to 2 p.p. above the benchmark for the (3-12 months)-spells, 
higher in the services than in manufacturing; between 4 and 7  p.p. for the long (12 
+)- spells; 
                                                 
18  We cannot altogether exclude the endogeneity of  the relative wage cost <d-clav> (possibly 
jointly determined with pseudo-survival). We instrument  <d-clav>  with  the various factors 
(dummies) used to build the cells, and re-estimate  ∆ survival by TSLS: none of the results that 
follow are affected by the procedure. Results are not displayed but are available on request. 
Regr  19-22 19-22 22-25  22-25 25-30 25-30 
 Services  Mfg  Services  Mfg  Services  Mfg 
d-clav  0  -.113 *  0  -.160 **  -.224 **  -.353 ** 
Dur 3-12  .016 *  .011  .019 *  .010  0  .017 
Dur 12 +  .040 ***  .066 ***  .043 ***  .043 ***  .033 **  .061 
*** 
Med  0  .005  .004  .010 *  .012 *  .008 
Big  0  .019 *  .011*  .027 ***  .019 *  .032 
*** 
Dum-entry YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Donn_entr  0  0 0 0  0  0 
Dpart_giov  0  0  0  .005 * *  0  .003 
R**2  adj  .08  .15  .08  .10  .07  .09 
n.  obs  951  933 939 906  861  867   22
-  firm size (benchmark = small) has some effect on survival in the 
manufacturing sectors of both North and South.  Not unexpectedly, less in the 
services where small size is the exception aside from the banking industry. The 
larger is firm size, the higher the survival, with an impact which is higher in the 
South and varies between 1 p.p. to a maximum of 3 p.p.; 
-  the regressions include the women inflows and the youth 
participation rates as regressors, but, with one exception,  neither is significant. 
Apparently pseudo-survival seems unaffected by the inflows of workers who 
might be expected to be the “competitors” of young males; 
-  labor cost growth (d-clav) is very significant, with the expected 
negative sign, except at age (19-22) in the service sectors of both North and South. 
The order of magnitude of the regression coefficient is between - .05 and -.35. 
This result needs clarification: the <d-clav>  variable, by construction, has a 
modest variability around 1.
19 It might, in principle, be collinear with the constant 
term. While multicollinearity is weakly rejected, omitting <d-clav> yields 
coefficients of all the regressors almost identical to the ones reported here, and 
also an overall fit - measured in terms of R**2 – somewhat lower; 
-  the year of entry-dummies are almost always negative, although not 
necessarily significant: a plausible reflection of the fact that the benchmark 1987 
was near the peak of the expansion in the second half of the Eighties; 
 
 
9  Estimating the impact of labor costs on 5-year survival 
 
I turn now to the impact of labor cost on pseudo-survival, net of business 
cycle effects. The break-down of the cyclical phase is the same as before. 
The diff-in-diff approach is appropriate for the task. I consider survival 5 
years from one’s first job in the first two sub-periods 1986-1991 and 1992-1996, 
and 4 years from first entry in the last sub-period 1998-2002 (for lack of recent 
reliable data). The estimated pseudo-survival rates (based on the above 
regressions) are as follows: 
 
A = survival until 1991 for workers entered in 1986, measured at current 
labor cost;  
B = survival until 1997 for workers entered in 1992, measured at current 
labor cost;  
C = survival until 2002 for workers entered in 1998, measured at current 
labor cost;  
D = as in A, using a counterfactual labor cost = average of period 1986-
1997 
                                                 
19Using the growth rate of labor cost (= d-clav – 1) would not solve the collinearity problem,  as it 
has a small dispersion around 0.   23
E = as in B, using a counterfactual labor cost = average of period 1992-
2002 
F = as in C, using a counterfactual labor cost = average of period 1986-
2002. 
Then:  
(A - B) = average impact of business cycle cum labor cost in the 1986-1991 
window 
(D – E) = average impact of business cycle in 1986-1991, at constant labor 
cost 
(A – B) - (D – E) = av. impact of labor cost in 1986-1991 net of business 
cycle effect. 
(B – C) = average impact of business cycle cum  labor cost in the 1992-
1997 window  
(E – F) = average impact of business cycle in 1992-1997, at constant labor 
cost 




Consider the following example. In manufacturing (North), group (22-25), 
estimated 5-year survival after 1986 entry is 0.861 (=A); the same after 1992 entry 
is lower (B = 0.840). The gross impact on survival of the (expansionary) business 
cycle cum labor cost is positive and equal to 2.1  p.p. (=A-B). Estimated 5-year 
survival after 1986 entry at constant labor cost is 0.872 (=D); the same after 1992 
entry is 0.842 (=E). The favorable business cycle, net of the impact of labor cost, 
accounts for 3.0 p.p. (=D-E), which is larger than the gross figure of 2.1 p.p. The 
diff-in-diff [(A-B-(D-E)] = - 0.9 p.p. is the estimated net impact of labor cost. In 
spite of the slight decrease of the growth rate of labor cost between the expansion 
and the recession, its net impact is negative, i.e. the positive labor cost dynamics 
has not tempered the impact of the downturn on survival rates.   24
 
Tab. 8: Estimated net impact of labor cost on pseudo survival 
Northern Italy 
Area  Sector  Gender  Age  First spell duration  (A-B)-(D-E) (B-C)-(E-F) 
North manifacturing  M  19-22  <=3  -0.0171  -0.0130 
North manifacturing  M 19-22  3-12  -0.0187  -0.0135 
North manifacturing  M 19-22  >12  0.0017  -0.0368 
North manifacturing  M 22-25  <=3  -0.0092  -0.0099 
North manifacturing  M 22-25  3-12  -0.0092  -0.0099 
North manifacturing  M 22-25  >12  -0.0092  -0.0099 
North manifacturing  M 25-30  <=3  -0.0238  -0.0201 
North manifacturing  M 25-30  3-12  -0.0238  -0.0201 
North manifacturing  M 25-30  >12  -0.0238  -0.0201 
North  services M  19-22  <=3  -0.0330  0.0123 
North services  M 19-22  3-12  -0.0330 0.0123 
North services  M 19-22  >12  -0.0330 0.0123 
North services  M 22-25  <=3  -0.0125  -0.0147 
North services  M 22-25  3-12  -0.0125  -0.0147 
North services  M 22-25  >12  -0.0125  -0.0147 
North services  M 25-30  <=3  -0.0028  -0.0171 
North services  M 25-30  3-12  -0.0028  -0.0171 
North services  M 25-30  >12  -0.0028  -0.0171 
 
Southern Italy 
Area  Sector  Gender  Age  First spell duration  (A-B)-(D-E) (B-C)-(E-F) 
South  manifacturing  M 19-22  <=3  -0.0120 -0.0137 
South manifacturing  M 19-22  3-12  -0.0120 -0.0137 
South manifacturing  M 19-22  >12  -0.0120 -0.0137 
South manifacturing  M 22-25  <=3  -0.0083 -0.0168 
South manifacturing  M 22-25  3-12  -0.0083 -0.0168 
South manifacturing  M 22-25  >12  -0.0083 -0.0168 
South manifacturing  M 25-30  <=3  -0.0148 -0.0487 
South manifacturing  M 25-30  3-12  -0.0148 -0.0487 
South manifacturing  M 25-30  >12  -0.0148 -0.0487 
South services  M 19-22  <=3  -0.0056  0.0034 
South services  M 19-22  3-12  -0.0056  0.0034 
South services  M 19-22  >12  -0.0056  0.0034 
South services  M 22-25  <=3  0.0014  0.0003 
South services  M 22-25  3-12  0.0014  0.0003 
South services  M 22-25  >12  0.0014  0.0003 
South services  M 25-30  <=3  -0.0281 -0.0241 
South services  M 25-30  3-12  -0.0281 -0.0241 
South services  M 25-30  >12  -0.0281 -0.0241 
 
Tab. 8 displays the net impact on pseudo-survival of wage growth in the 
manufacturing and service sectors of Northern and Southern Italy respectively. 
The first column refers to the expansionary phase 1986-91; the second to the 
recessionary period 1992-96. As it has been already pointed out, average labor 
cost has slightly declined in the passage. Surprisingly the net impact of labor cost 
in the 1986-91 window is negative (i.e. it has accelerated  the process of disposal),   25
and fairly sizeable: up to - 3.3 p.p. and over in the North and - 2.8 p.p. in the 
South. The net impact in the 1992-97 window is also negative, but smaller (in 
absolute terms), with the interesting exception of the manufacturing sector of the 
South where it approaches -5 p.p among workers aged 25-30. 
 
 
10  Self-selection behind the door ? 
  
A problem of self-selection could be raised in connection with our 
measurement of “disposable” workforce. The individuals whom we consider 
“disposed” workers once they leave the panel and are no longer observable could, 
in principle, be entering the business world (excluding self employment, which we 
do observe and account for), the public sector and/ or the professions, on a path of 
upward mobility. In this paragraph I intend to show that, while the problem exists, 
it is negligible and will leave results unchanged. 
 
The first and stronger argument derives from par. 3 where I explain that 
almost all the young people who move into the public sector are observed in the 
WHIP database, the only exceptions being the military service and the police 
corps. I also explain that the number of those moving in the professions below 30 
years of age is negligible. 
The second consideration is that the quickly “disposed” individuals have 
had very short initial employment spells and are in the lowest percentiles of the 
wage distribution. This strongly suggest that early disposal has very negative 
connotations. Which is not sufficient to exclude self-selection, but is another 
signal that points in this direction. 
The third and final argument integrates the last one. I explore the post-entry 
wages 5 years after the first job spell of individuals who have not been “disposed” 
in the first five years of career: post-entry wages appear to be strongly negatively 
influenced by the length of the initial spell. Additional controls are necessary to 
account for the impact that job-to-job mobility may have on wages. Not only do I 
distinguish between stayers (on their first job) and movers, but, for the latter, I also 
take into account the firm size of origin and destination of the last change (there 
could be more than one). This multiplies the number of original cells by a factor of  
9 (3 x 3 firm sizes), but, as done before, we retain only those that are left with at 
least 3 individuals (2922). Deflated average cell wages are regressed against the 
variables that define the cells, including those reflecting mobility. Results are 
displayed in Appendix 1. A problem of self-selection might arise, in that the 
individuals included in this sub-sample are the “lucky” ones who have not been 
disposed in the first 5 years of career. This occurrence, however, would strengthen 
our conclusion as the significance of the initial job spell on post-entry wages could 
be hidden by the selection. It is not: a good start at entry (employment spells >12 
months) is very significant and yield a premium of 48 EU/month  over the shorter   26
spells (the 3 -12 month-dummy is below significance, the benchmark being 
provided by the <less than 3 months> spell)
20. The premium of a good start may, 
at first sight, appear too small compared to the one associated with a bad start (< 3 
months). This is not the case: in fact, we are imposing a strong restriction on the 
bad starts that must last at least 5 years: thus, a large number of “bad starts” get 
disposed before ever reaching that moment. Altogether, I feel therefore confident 
that self-selection is a very unlikely event. 
 
 
11 Conclusions   
 
The overall picture is now sufficiently clear: workforce disposal is evident 
and quite dramatic. The order of magnitude is consistent with the official LFS 
youth unemployment rate increased by a reasonable estimate of the number of 
workers who end up in irregular, undetectable activities. Regression analysis 
catches the short and medium run impact of several factors: age, initial entry 
conditions (the length of the first employment spell), business cycle, labor cost. 
The net impact of labor cost on 5-year survival is negative (i.e. it reduces survival) 
and relatively high in manufacturing, somewhat less in the service industries. It is 
more negative in the expansionary 1986-91 window, than in the recessionary 
1992-97 time period. Unfortunately a complete econometric explanation of the - 
by now 25-years long - process of workforce disposal is not at hand, for lack of 
data that cover the early stages of the process. Which was undoubtedly supported 
by a sequence of labor market reforms initiated in the mid Eighties, aimed at 
enhancing youth employability with the introduction of highly flexible and often 
subsidized working contracts. To a large extent, as argued before, the reforms 
sanctioned a process which was already under way. 
 
A preliminary address to the long run perspective must rely on cross-
country comparisons of a few significant macro indicators (tab. 9). Italy and Spain 
are the only two European countries where employment growth 2000-08 exceeds 
GNP growth (at constant prices). Not only does labor productivity turn downwards 
(a direct consequence of the latter), but so does multi-factor productivity since 
1995. This finding strongly supports the idea that the wide utilization of temporary 
                                                 
20 Some of the other results are not surprising: age is influential; so is the geographical area 
(North outperforms South) and the activity branch (manufacturing looses to the services). The 
mobility pattern yields an interesting and highly statistically significant ranking: <big-big> is the 
benchmark and tops the list, followed by: <med-big> - 107, <stayers> - 111, <small-big> -137, 
<big-med> - 189, <med-med> - 239, <small-med> - 251, <big-small> - 258,  
<med-small> - 290, <small-small> - 319. 
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contracts for the vast majority of new hires
21, and the ensuing process of 
workforce disposal (and waste of human capital) may have been the driving force 
behind these developments. 
Additional evidence of Italy’s weak position vis-à-vis the rest of its direct 
EU competitors is signaled by the pattern of real wages: stagnant since the early 
Nineties, while in the rest of Europe they were increasing by 10% in the market  
sectors and by 20% and over in manufacturing (fig. 9). 
 
Tab.9: OECD 2000-2008 growth rates and multi-factor productivity 
 Employment  GNP   
constant prices 






Au 8,2  23,4  15,1       
Be 6,7  16,0  9,3       
Dk 3,9  10,4  6,5  1,5    0,6 
Fl 8,4 25,0 16,6  1,3 0,3 1,6 
Fr 5,8 14,1 8,3  1,7 2,1 1,0 
Ge 6,0  9,7  3,7  1,4  1,1  0,6 
Gr 11,8  35,8  24,0    1,0  
Ire 26,1  43,4  17,3  3,3  3,5  2,5 
It 10,3  7,3  -3  1,3  0,1  -0,7 
Nl 7,7 16,5 8,8  1,0 0,8 0,7 
Por 3,1  7,9  4,8    1,2  0,3 
Sp 29,9  28,0  -1.9    0,1 -0,1 
Swe 10,4  19,8  9.4  0,5  1,8  2,7 
Uk 8,5  20,4  11,9  1,0  1,2  1,2 
 
 
                                                 
21As is well known Spain introduced a major reform in 1996 that allowed almost all new hires to 
be on a temporary basis. A few years later, more restrictive rules were introduced in the 
legislation; nevertheless, the share of temporary workers in Spain is still much higher than 
anywhere else in Europe.   28
 
Fig. 9 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Weighted OLS regression on real wages  5 years after first job entry 
 Coeff.   
Age 22-25  43** 
Age 25-30  114*** 
North 165*** 
Manufacturing -109*** 
First spell  
3-12 months 
15 





















  A nutshell model of labor demand involving permanent vs. temporary 
contracts 
 
Different models of labor demand of young people, where employers may 
choose between permanent non-subsidized working contracts or subsidized 
temporary contracts, yield similar indications: permanent contracts are preferred to 
temporary contracts if the fiscal opportunity cost of not using a temporary contract 
plus the expected firing cost is smaller than the training cost and/or loss of 
productivity associated with hiring a young unexperienced worker via the 
subsidized contract. A very simple two-period model developed in B. Contini 
(2006) yields the following condition: 
 
“permanent” is  preferred to “temporary” iff 
    w(1-t) + (1 – gp) FC < f 
where: 
 
(i) subsidy (t) Æ thus opportunity cost of not using “temporary” = [ w(1-t) ]; 
(ii) business conditions [g = probability of high aggregate demand) 
(iii) worker quality (p = probability of finding a good match).   30
A value of (1-gp close to 1 is the probability of low demand & bad worker quality, 
which leads to a layoff;  
(iv)  firing cost FC; 
(v)  training cost f (= opportunity loss incurred if “temporary” are hired) 
 
The following are to be expected: 
- the subsidized temporary contracts will be preferred when the wage 
subsidy is sufficiently high; 
- the temporary contract is preferred in positions that require low skills, i.e. 
where the training cost of the unskilled or their foregone productivity is low; 
- the advantage of  hiring via permanent contracts is higher, the higher the 
“quality” of the candidate recruits; 
- large firms will have a relative preference for temporary workers, as firing 
costs are higher than in small firms
22. 
 
In Italy, since the mid Nineties, the conditions favouring the wide 
utilization of temporary and disposable contracts were all in place (in addition, 
aggregate demand never fully recovered after the recession of 1992-94). As a 
consequence many young people – presumably those with a short experience and 
modest skills - were laid off at termination of the temporary contracts. Nor was 
there sufficient advantage for different employers to hire the ones who were laid 
off, as their previous experience (at most two years) would seldom be considered 
valuable, a minimal amount of additional training necessary, and the benefits 
granted by the existing provisions to new temporary hires higher than any other 
solution. 
                                                 
22Three of the four above expected results were found to hold in B. Contini  (2005). No evidence 
was available on the one related to workers’ “quality”, for lack of appropriate indicators of 
quality.   31
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